Examining the Monetary Causes of the Economic Slowdown by Hull, Everson
EXAMINING THE MO.NETARY CAUSES OF THE ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN 




THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM 
DATE ORIGINATED 0 4 / 0 5 / 8 2  
DATE UPDATED 0 7 / 2 0 / 8 2  
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 2 8 7 - 5 7 0 0  
0 7 2 1  
CRS- 1 
ISSUE DEFINITION 
The economy is currently going through a difficult transition from a 
period of accelerating inflation to a period of more moderate price 
increases. Since 1955, there has been a disturbing trend in the U.S. 
economy, in which inflation has accelerated from a higher base after each 
recession. Moreover, the underlying rate of inflation has shown a tendency 
to continue rising through economic expansions as well as contractions. The 
current downturn marks the sixth recession that the U.S. has experienced 
since 1955 and the prospects appear good that the economy will emerge with a 
lower inflation rate than has been the case in these past recessions. Since 
March of 1980, the rate of inflation has fallen dramatically. In March 
through June of 1981, the annualized inflation rate as measured by the 
consumer price index (CPI) was at less than double-digit levels--7.5% at an 
annual rate- -over this four-month period. The last previous four-month 
period of single-digit inflation rates was recorded for the period December 
1977 to March 1978. In the six-month period through March 1982 the CpI has 
increased at an annual rate of only 3.2% During March the CPI fell a t  an 
annual rate of 3.6%, the first decline in seventeen years. However, the 
moderation in inflation has been accompanied by high and volatile interest 
rates and periods of sluggish economic growth. 
This issue brief investigates the effects of changes in money supply 
growth on the current economic conditions. The results presented are based 
upon a statistical methodology outlined in a CRS report (No.82-43E, March 
1982) of the same title. The approach may be distinguished from most 
previous work along these lines in that it attempts to estimate the 
statistical significance of the 1979-82 deceleration in monetary growth. The 
resulting estimates are then employed in analyzing the timing implications of 
decelerating monetary growth for episodes of high and volatile interest 
rates, for lower inflation, and for unstable economic growth. 
BACKGROUND 
The U.S. economy was subjected to severe strains during 1981 with serious 
consequences for interest-sensitive sectors. Real GNP was virtually flat 
during the year's middle two quarters followed by a major slump in the fourth 
quarter. These slack conditions have continued into the first quarter of 
1982 with real GNP falling by 3.9%. Industrial production declined at a 
compound annual rate of 11.3% from July 1981 to April 1982, while civilian 
employment showed a decline of almost 1.8% over the same nine-month period. 
Unemployment, by contrast, rose sharply from 7.2% in July 1981 to 9.4% of the 
civilian labor force in April 1982. 
It is important not to lose sight of the reasons for the current slack 
economic conditions. In light of the dramatic decline in the overall rate of 
inflation that has occurred in recent months, it is very easy to overlook the 
potential dangers of a resurgence in high inflation rates. Recession causes 
tremendous hardship for many. Unlike sustained and accelerating inflation, 
however, recession is a cyclical phenomenon that need not seriously weaken 
the potential growth of the economy over the long run. As the focus of 
national attention shifts from inflation to recession, it is important to 
understand the links between clear discretionary policies directed at curbing 
an endemic inflation and the associated side-effects on the economy. A close 
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look at key developments during 1980 and 1981 points to a few fundamental 
forces that have been slowing the rate of inflation while at the same time 
retarding economic growth. 
DECELERATING MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH 
Most measures of monetary and fiscal action moved in the direction of 
restriction in 1980 and 1981. In the case of fiscal policy an increse in 
social security taxes, the introduction of a so-called windfall profits tax 
on crude oil revenues, and inflation-induced increases in personal taxes have 
combined to produce a rising tax burden that has helped dampen consumer and 
investment spending. Meanwhile, on the side of monetary policy, actions have 
been taken by the Federal Reserve System to dramatize its resolve to slow 
money growth to help curb the rate of inflation. These actions, first 
announced on October 6th 1979, have shifted the focus of.short-run guidelines 
for open market operatias away from changes in interest rates (the price of 
money) to changes in the reserve aggregates (the quantity of money). 
Since the Federal Reserve's announced change, the growth rates of the 
monetary aggregates have shown marked month-to-month fluctuations. 
Nonetheless, there has been a noticeable slowing in the growth of the key 
variables over the longer term. Long-run growth in M1-B (currency, demand 
deposits and other checkable deposits), the most closely watched money supply 
indicator, has slowed substantially. After growing at 8.3% per annum during 
1978, growth in M1-B slowed to 7.1% during 1979, to 6.6% during 1980 and to 
6.4% during 1981. During the first 3 months of 1982 the growth rate of M1-B 
averaged 6.5%, but during April there was a resurgence in growth that 
averaged 8.6%. Beginning with the money supply figures released on Jan. 15, 
1982 for the week ending Jan. 6 ,  1982, the existing M1-B measure has been 
relabeled M1 and the shift-adjusted M1-B measure together with M1-A (currency 
and coin plus commercial bank deposits held by the non-bank public) have been 
dropped. The Federal Reserve has continued to release estimates of M2 (i.e., 
M1-B plus savings and small tjme deposits and money market mutual funds) as 
well as M3 (i.e., M2 plus large time deposits). 
The statistical estimates show that on a year-over-year basis the 
1979/1981 deceleration in growth rates of the monetary aggregates has been 
more protracted than that of any other continuous period during the last 20 
years. With the exception of M3 the rate of growth of which showed a modest 
increase during 1981, all of the main monetary growth indicators showed 
sustained rates of deceleration on a year-over-year basis during the period 
1979 to 1981. 
Although growth among the monetary indicators (Ml-B, M2, and M3) showed 
marked deceleration over the period 1979 to 1981, the rate of deceleration 
was neither atypical by historical standards nor significantly different 
statistically from past experience. Significant rates of deceleration were 
reflected in the behavior of both M1-A and the monetary base, but these 
decelerations were less important in terms of financial stringency than in 
the past because of shifts in the distribution of deposits. 
The deceleration in money supply growth has important implications for 
changes in interest rates in the near term, for changes in real economic 
growth in the intermediate term and for changes in inflation in the somewhat 
longer term. An examination of the causal links between changes in the money 
supply and changes in each of these three key economic indicators offers some 
insight into the forces that account for the recent volatility in interest 
rates, the decline in real growth, and the accompanying decline in the rate 
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of inflation. 
VOLATILITY OF SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES 
Several conflicting explanations have been offered for the recent volatile 
movements in interest rates. What seems clear, however, is that there has 
been a marked response to changes in market forces that has contributed to 
fairly typical contracyclical movements in these rates. One frequently heard 
explanation attributes high interest rates to the apprehension of financial 
market participants stemming from the large absolute deficits projected under 
the Economic Recovery Plan. With the economy conspicuously weaker than many 
forecasters had anticipated, and with tax cuts of unprecedented size 
forthcoming, the outlook for the deficit has worsened. Yet, despite a 
widening deficit, interest rates fell with considerable speed through much of 
the second half of 1981. 
For example, from Sept. 4 ,  1981 to Nov. 27, 1981, the interest rate on 
three-month treasury bills fell by 5.4 percentage points from 15.6% to 10.2%. 
Since November of 1981, movements in short- term interest rates have followed 
a roller-coaster pattern, increasing steadily during the months of December 
and January and falling during the months of February and April. These 
spasmodic declines in interest rates raise questions as to whether the 
expected size of the Federal budget deficit is the key determinant of the 
recent high short-term interest rates or of their recent volatility. 
Moreover, reported projections of the deficit are somewhat tenuous at this 
time. The concensus (mean) forecast as reflected by leading econometric 
firms, Data Resources Inc. (DRI) and Chase Econometrics (Chase) together with 
the Administration, project the deficit at about $122.4 billion during 1982. 
This estimate comprises 4.1% of an expected Gross National Product of $3,106 
billion, and is not out of line with comparable periods of recession in the 
past. To be sure, during the 1975 recession, the ratio of the deficit to GNP 
was a somewhat higher 4.5%. As the economy recovers during 1983 and 1984 
these forecasters anticipate smaller deficits of $122 and $109 billion for 
respective shares of nominal GNP of 3.5% and 2.8%. 
There is another plausible and basic reason for the high and volatile 
short-term rates of interest experienced during most of 1980 and 1981. In 
the absence of institutionally imposed ceilings, the price of any commodity 
(including money) will increase when there is excess demand for that 
commodity. To illustrate the relationship between short-term interest rate 
movements, the supply of money, and the demand for money as reflected in 
private business loans, the period since March 1980 has been subdivided into 
five time intervals. 
TABLE 1 shows that during the.first period, March to June of 1980, M1-B 
decreased at a compounded annual rate of 1.8%, while private business loans 
fell by 9.3%. At the same time, interest rates on 4-month comercial paper 
fell by 8.6 percentage points from 16.8% in March of 1980 to 8.2% in June. 
The latter half of 1980 was characterized by sharp increases in both the 
money supply M1B and business loans with the growth rate for loans outpacing 
that of the money supply. Concurrently, there was almost a doubling of the 
commercial paper rate from 8.2% to 15.1%. While money supply growth 
decelerated sharply during most of 1981, continued strong business loan 
expansion through the first three quarters of the year helped sustain the 
commercial paper rate at high levels. However, as business loan growth fell 
during October and November there an accompanying sizable decline in interest 
rates. The most recently available data for the months of November thru 
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April show a dramatic surge in the demand for private business loans despite 
the weak economic conditions. During the months of November thru April 
business loans expanded at 21.0% while the money supply increased at 9.7%. 
At the same time, there was an associated rise in the commercial paper rate 
to 14.0%. 
Another explanation for the most recent episode of high interest rates is 
offered by Professor David I. Meiselman. His explanation, which appears in 
Tax Review, Vol. XLII, No. 6, attributes the recent episode of high rates not 
to the expected size of the Federal budget deficit under the Economic 
Recovery Plan nor to any lack of confidence in the plan by financial 
institutions. Meiselman places the "blame" squarely on the Federal Reserve's 
execution of monetary policy. He argues that interest rates, after falling 
throughout most of the first quarter of 1981, began an upward trend in the 
second quarter in direct response to excessively rapid growth of money in 
March and April. During these months M1-B increased at compound annual rates 
of 13.9% and 24.7%, respectively, greatly exceeding the Federal Reserve's 
targets. 
This development, Professor Meiselman argues, occurred after some 
noticeable progress had been made in restraining the growth of money. For 
example, for the year ending February of 1981, M1-B grew at a compound annual 
rate of 6.1%, showing a decline from the 8.5% per annum rate of the prior 
year. Meiselman argues that the volatile movements in money supply growth 
during this period raised serious concern among financial institutions about 
the Fed's willingness and/or ability to meet its own targets for money 
growth. 
Meiselman's observation that a short-run excess supply of money leads to a 
surge in interest rates may appear to be counter- intuitive and may be 
considered the opposite of the results predicted by the demand-supply 
approach discussed above. One way of reconciling these differences is to 
recognize that in an environment in Which inflation is not fully anticipated 
an increase in money supply growth leads at least to a transitory reduction 
in interest rates as excess money supply is injected into the market. 
However, when inflation is anticipated perverse developments may occur. 
For example, Meiselman points out that the increased money supply may 
renew expectations of inflation. If financial institutions are unconvinced 
that inflation will be controlled, an inflation premium will be added to the 
real rate of interest that has the effect of raising nominal rates of 
interest. This important distinction between the nominal and real rates of 
inflation was developed by Irving Fisher in the 1890s. Fisher's theory 
relating monetary growth, price expectations and nominal interest rates is 
presented in his book titled, The Theory of Interest. His theory helps to 
rationalize the puzzling, though well-documented empirical association 
between high interest rates and high inflation. 
SLOWING INFLATION 
The level of interest rates hinges closely on the outlook for inflation. 
A decelerating rate of inflation has been an important objective of monetary 
policy. Inflation as measured by the CPI was at an average annual rate of 
6.6% over the last 12-month period compared to 10.0% in the preceding 
12-month period. The major cost of implementing a monetary policy of this 
kind is the increase in unemployment that ensues. The magnitude of the 
unemployment as well as its time path depend critically on whether the 
inflation rate is reduced rapidly or gradually. A monetary policy that 
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reduces the rate of inflation rapidly will likely result in higher short-term 
unemployment than would a less rapid approach. 
A reduced rate of money supply growth imposes on economic agents the need 
for making painful, though economic choices between alternatives. In a 
restrictive money environment, as interest rates rise in the short-run, there 
is a reduction in demand for interest-sensitive commodities (e.g., housing 
and autos). With the decline in demand for these commodities, there is a 
corresponding reduction in price that helps moderate the general rate of 
inflation. 
A reduction in the money supply growth may also slow inflation through its 
effects On real wealth and consumer spending. Higher rates of interest that 
Stem from slower money supply growth imply higher discount rates in 
determining the present value of an e.xpected stream of income. These higher 
capitalization rates reduce the current market value of real wealth. Of 
course, for a given supply, a reduction in real wealth reduces -spending and 
inflation. 
Over the long-run, the prospective increase in relative values of 
financial assets that occurs as inflation subsides and interest rates fall, 
induces a substitution away from real or physical assets towards financial 
assets. This effect reinforces the reduction in the demand for real assets 
and helps further to moderate their rise in price or actually to bring prices 
down. The net effect is that a non-accommodating monetary regime generates 
reinforcing events that moderate or place downward pressure on prices of 
physical assets and thereby on the general rate of inflation. 
A review of the relevant data reveals certain recurring and systematic 
tendencies in the behavior of money growth and inflation that deserve 
attention. The data reveal that an increase in money supply growth tends, on 
balance, to occur about two years before a corresponding rise in the general 
rate of inflation. The degree of association is striking. When the monetary 
aggregates have been increasing at an increasing rate, there is a tendency 
for inflation to accelerate about two years later. Conversely, periods for 
which the rates of inflation are moderating tend to be preceded two years 
earlier by decelerating growth in the money supply. 
Although the timing evidence presented here is not empirical proof of an 
independent influence of changes in money growth on inflation, such evidence 
is highly suggestive. To examine this relationship further, analysts have 
applied somewhat more robust techniques. For example, Michael Bazdarich of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco applies tests of causality to 
quarterly data over the period of 1957's first quarter to 1979's second 
quarter. He finds that all four key monetary indicators tested have 
significant causal effects on the consumer price index (CPI), the producer 
price index (PPI), the GNP deflator and the consumer expenditures 
deflator.These four monetary variables are M1 (currency plus demand 
deposits), M2 (currency plus all bank deposits except large time 
certificates), the source base (sources of the monetary base as defined by 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors) and the St. Louis Base (the monetary 
base adjusted for reserve requirement changes, as defined by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis). 
SLUGGISH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Most theories that attempt to explain aggregate demand relationships 
recognize the importance of changes in the money supply. According to these 
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theories, a reduction in money supply growth creates excess demand in money 
and credit markets that pushes up interest rates. As firms find it more 
expensive to borrow to finance investment projects, investment falls, 
contributing to a loss in real output. Housing construction and consumer 
purchases of durable goods also are interest-sensitive. The ultimate effects 
on real GNP depend on both the sharpness and duration of the decline. 
There is a striking degree of uniformity in the historical relationship 
between accelerating and decelerating growth in the monetary indicators and 
growth in real GNP one year later. Sustained periods of declining or slow 
growth in real economic activity, such as occurred during the periods, 
1969:4thQ to 1970:4thQ, 1973:4thQ to 1975:lstQ, and 1978:lstQ to 1980:lstQ, 
tend to be preceded one year earlier by fairly sharp deceleration in money 
supply growth. Conversely, periods of sustained growth such as occurred 
during the periods 1970:4thQ to 1973:4thQ, 1975:lstQ to 1978:lstQ and 
1980:lstQ to 1981:3rdQ, tend to be preceded one year earlier by a fairly 
sharp acceleration in money supply growth. 
Many economists have challenged the view that changes in money supply tend 
to lead (precede) changes in economic activity. They argue essentially that 
the Federal Reserve should respond to the "needs of trade." If an 
insufficient supply of money pushes up interest rates, according to this 
view, the monetary authority attempts to limit this increase by providing 
bank reserves as necessary to accommodate the fluctuating demand of their 
borrowing customers. 
Using fairly robust econometric techniques, researchers have attempted to 
examine the independence of Federal Reserve behavior to assess the extent to 
which the Central Bank accommodates the "needs of tradew or alternatively 
pursues an independent predetermined money growth policy. Michael Bazdarich, 
of the San Francisco Federal Reserve for examplem seeks to determine whether 
the Federal Reserve expands the supply of money and credit in response to 
large cost increases in specific industries to avoid the temporary output 
losses and increases in unemployment that might otherwise ensue. Of course, 
the effect of this policy action would be to avert or mitigate a slump in 
economic growth initially but at the cost of higher long-term inflation and a 
serious slump later. 
Bazdarich applies econometric tests of causality to more than 1 7  
indicators that reflect cost-push pressures for the period 1959 to 1979 in 
search of evidence of monetary accommodation. His results do not lend 
support to the view that the Federal Reserve responds to "the needs of 
trade. 'I For most cases, Bazdarich's results indicate significant and 
widespread one-way causality emanating from the money supply aggregates to 
respective cost or price indexes. At the same time, there was no evidence of 
the reverse effect that showed systematic and significant evidence of 
monetary accommodation. 
CRS- 7 




Mar.80 to June 80 
M1 a/ Loans - Paper Rate b/ 
-1.8 -9.3 8.17 
June 80 to Nov.80 15.3 20.3 15.09 
Nov. 81 to Apr. 82 9.7 21.0 13.96 
- 
- / Ml=currency plus demand deposits 
- / Rates as of last month in period. 
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SUMMARY 
The restrained monetary growth of the past three years has contributed to 
turning inflation down more rapidly than many analysts expected. As 
inflation moderated, however, and as interest rates pursued an unsteady 
decline, there was no firm discretionary fiscal policy in place to help 
offset the adverse effects on employment, product and real incomes. 
The Administration has stated that the success or failure of its e ~ 0 n 0 m i C  
recovery plan hinges heavily on the accompanying posture of monetary policy. 
The Federal Reserve may continue its focus on restricting monetary growth in 
the fight against inflation. If the path of monetary deceleration continues 
to be as unstable as has been the case over the last three years, however 
there could be a re-occurrence of volatile and high interest rates with 
periods of sharp decline in real economic activity. Any such volatility, 
however, does not preclude even lower rates of inflation than already 
observed, at least through the year 1983. Because of an apparent two-year 
lag between changes in money supply growth and changes in the rate of 
inflation, it is highly probable that the deceleration in money growth that 
has already occurred for the period 1980 to 1981 will lead to further 
declines in the rate of inflation. 
Also, if the Federal Reserve is successful in decelerating and holding 
monetary growth to a more stable path, there is, in addition, a greater 
probability of lower interest rates with less volatility than has been the 
case during the past two years. If inflation continues to noticeably abate, 
the stage will be set for a renewal of economic activity with sustained 
growth in productivity. 
